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Abstract 
The impact of new technology (ICT) on labour markets and welfare is analyzed in a model 
of matching. First, ICT lowers cost and speed of market access, thus reducing frictions in 
matching a searching worker to an opportunity. It raises output and lowers the cost of entry 
for a new firm. The rise in scale of aggregate employment raises productivity. Second, since 
the net effect of ICT raises the probability of a successful search by workers relative to a 
successful search by firms, workers share of the match surplus rises. Third, it induces more 
learning and innovation. Fourth, ICTs allows hitherto excluded segments to access new 
networks. This reduces the ability of members of an existing network to extract the entire 
surplus from a new entrant. Finally, it encourages cumulative improvements in technology 
and skills. More labour-using technological progress is induced. Multiple equilibria are 
possible, however, due to endogenous choice of training and technology. Therefore 
investment in training and technology may be at less than socially optimal levels. Policy 
implications follow.  
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1. Introduction 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs), which support the Internet and global 
telecommunication networks, reduce frictions and search costs in labour markets. They also 
allow access to geographically separated entrants. Thus it is possible for a worker in one 
country to be employed in, or do some work for, a firm in another country. One variant of 
this, business process outsourcing, affects the welfare of millions as work migrates across 
the globe to find the lowest cost supplier. Opportunities improve for one set of workers, but 
others face more competition. Since the issue is emotive but relatively new there have been 
many journalistic pieces and initial estimates1, but less analysis. The latter is necessary to 
understand deeper causes and resulting trends. No one has applied2 matching models to 
explore the effects of new technology, although they are well suited to analyze distance work. 
 
Such models were developed to move away from a Walrasian coordination of market 
demand to supply to understand the disaggregated process through which unfilled vacancies 
and unemployed workers have to find a suitable match. The models made analysis of 
individual decisions possible but they could be used to understand the evolution of aggregate 
                                     
1 A report for the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) estimates that 2 percent of ten 
million US computer related jobs have been sent abroad and 12 percent of IT companies have outsourced work 
largely to countries in Asia and Latin America (Global Insight, 2004). A high-end projection from Forrester 
Research predicts a loss of 3.3 million US jobs by 2015, including 1.7 million back-office jobs. But this is still 
only a small dent in the American labour market. Amicus, the largest British private sector union, quotes the 
biggest figure of an expected loss of 200,000 UK jobs by 2008. The Confederation of British Industries is 
worried that 43 percent of British companies are considering relocating even head office functions to India 
(Rajghatta, 2004). But job loss may be only temporary, as export of low skill service jobs increases high skill 
jobs, lowers costs and raises productivity. McKinsey Global Institute (2003) estimates that one dollar of US 
job loss creates from 1.45 to 1.47 dollars of global value added out of which the US gets back 1.12 to 1.14 
dollars through various channels, including higher exports, while the country receiving the offshoring job gets 
just 33 cents. Dossani and Kenney (2003) mention that outsourcing to India saved GE $340 million annually. 
ITAA-Global Insight study estimates that most US industries would gain new jobs in the long run due to 
offshore IT outsourcing. New jobs created due to offshore IT outsourcing in 2003 were 90,264, and were 
projected to increase to 317,367 by 2008. Global sourcing was also projected to benefit other US economic 
indicators. Chris Anderson writes in “Wired” that 20 percent of the budget of American firms will be freed to 
come up with creativity and more workers will be focused on innovation. The rise in per capita incomes 
elsewhere will raise American exports.  
2 Egger and Falkinger (2003) examine the distributional effects of outsourcing in a very different general 
equilibrium trade model. Chen, Ishikawa and Wu (2004) focus on the strategic aspects of outsourcing. 
Grossman and Helpman (2002) examine the implications of incomplete contracts, and Feenstra and Hanson 
(1995) examine the effects of outsourcing on relative wages between skilled and unskilled workers. Kuhn 
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unemployment and its cyclical behaviour (Diamond, 1982, Pissarides, 1990). The difficulty 
of search and of making a perfect pairing meant that equilibrium unemployment would exist 
even with free entry. In later work matching models were extended to analyze endogenous 
education and technology choice, the implications for inefficiencies in training (Acemoglu, 
1997) and for endogenous growth (Laing et.al., 1995).  
 
These stochastic matching and bargaining models, with heterogeneous workers and frictions 
in the labour market, are applied here to analyze distance work. Frictions model the lack of 
perfect information in distance work; heterogeneity captures the diversity in skills of 
knowledge workers. These two factors imply that a match is random--attributes are not 
perfectly matched. ICT lowers the cost and speed of market access, facilitates better 
matching of skills, raises worker productivity, and lowers the entry cost of new firms. All of 
these are parameters in matching models. Outsourcing depends on assured quality of work, 
which requires harmonization of standards and relationship specific investment when 
contracts are necessarily incomplete (Grossman and Helpman, 2002). ICT reduces 
transaction costs in finding and maintaining such a relationship. It facilitates the spread of 
common standards and of monitoring, which can compensate to some extent for 
incompleteness of contracts. By creating more opportunities and making markets thicker, it 
reduces the degree of specificity of investment. All of this can be modeled as an 
improvement in matching technology. A steady-state growth rate of workers captures the 
effect of easier entry of distant workers. The assumption of free entry for firms gives model 
closure in the long-run, and captures an essential attribute of the knowledge driven 
economy: the decreasing importance of the physical capital constraint. The model also shifts 
attention away from the short term and direct job relocations to indirect and long-run effects, 
and to policy that can improve the short and the long-run. Although labour market flexibility 
increases, labour’s bargaining power actually rises over time. 
 
                                                                                                                
(2003) surveys work on the effect of the Internet on labour markets using matching models, but the focus there 
is on traditional questions of duration of unemployment. 
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We explore the effects of ICT first in a stochastic matching model in which opportunities in 
one region are randomly matched to searches made by entrants, who could belong to another 
region. Under free entry of firms the result is that higher productivity and scale economies 
benefit both parties. In such models, heterogeneity and the absence of a spot market implies 
that returns are not driven to the outside options or opportunity costs. A match occurs only if 
it creates a surplus. Relative bargaining power decides the distribution of this match surplus. 
While improved matching benefits both firms and workers equally, reduction in the cost of 
entry for employers (technological innovation), and higher employee productivity (training 
and technology) raise employees share of the match surplus. Since the net effect of ICT 
raises the probability of a successful search by workers relative to a successful search by 
firms, workers benefit. Benefits to workers come from more jobs, higher wages and 
distribution of match surplus3.  
 
Second, making technology and education choice endogenous reinforces the results. In 
addition multiple equilibria occur. Policy can have a major impact by ensuring the better 
equilibrium.  
 
Third, modeling aspects of networks shows that shares of new entrants may be low because 
established firms can leverage their large networks. Strategic dynamic effects influence 
bargaining positions (Farrell and Klemperer, 2002). ICT makes it feasible for new entrants 
to participate in networks. But for this open standards and the creation of institutions that 
support specialized open networks are essential. In the ICT industry itself open standards are 
the rule, because when network effects are large all parties benefit from standardization, 
which increases network size. Globalization and the use of ICT make networks important in 
other activities as well.   
 
Wider access to ICT is important, but its major impact on equality comes through inducing 
more training and innovation. Therefore policies should focus on these factors in both 
                                     
3 These factors imply that wages can rise sooner with trade in services (which is another definition of 
outsourcing) compared to the standard result that wages first fall and then rise with freer trade (Rama, 2003) 
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regions. Open standards are especially necessary for intermediate products. Markets access 
combined with strict output quality standards can induce skill development. A ban on 
outsourcing will harm this innovation process, and especially if imposed unilaterally by one 
country, would harm its firms and leave it behind in the global development process. Since 
firms make large transient profits, a low temporary profit tax may be used to create a welfare 
fund for training and redeploying local workers who loose jobs due to outsourcing. If there 
is free entry of firms, and skill upgradation of workers, fears of sustained local 
unemployment due to some jobs being matched abroad are unfounded. More local jobs will 
be created as profits rise and activity expands. 
 
The paper develops the matching model and presents its results in section 2, brings in 
endogenous training and technology choice in section 3, presents a simple model of 
networks and surplus extraction in section 4, and draws together detailed policy conclusions 
in section 5. Proofs are in the appendix.     
 
2. A Model of the Matching Process 
We adapt a matching model to examine the effect of new technology and of policy related to 
it, on labour markets. The technology allows distance workers in underdeveloped region B 
to be matched to firms in developed region A. Workers will be used as a generic term, which 
could stand for service providers, traders, or firms. We abstract from the process that 
matches region A workers to firms in the same region. Region A has thicker markets and 
higher productivity so that wages in region A are higher than in region B.  
 
There is a continuum of heterogeneous workers who search (S) for an employment 
opportunity. Firms create opportunities (O).  O and S are aggregate measures of 
opportunities and searches. A stochastic CRS matching technology M is a proxy for the 
complex process of bringing together firms and workers. In order to focus on the effect of 
reduction in match frictions, we rule out increasing returns in the technology itself. For the 
same reason, we also abstract from credit constraints, aggregate demand externalities, and 
other sources of increasing returns. Technological externalities do not arise since the output 
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of a pair does not depend on other agents in the economy. The workers and firms are risk-
neutral so that the wage does not perform an insurance function. 
 
A firm incurs a cost c to acquire the technology and then employs at most one worker to 
create output y.  New opportunities can be created and eliminated costlessly. A filled 
opportunity (F) and an employed worker (E) quit the search market. Employed and 
searching workers add up to the total labour force.  Since there is no spot market 
determining a uniform competitive wage, wages they are not driven to the outside option.  
There is a match surplus (MS), which is shared by a Nash bargaining process.  The share of 
the MS going to the worker is φ, while the firm gets 1-φ. Agents are infinitely lived, in a 
continuous time framework, and new agents enter at the rate β.   Each agent has an identical 
instantaneous discount rate r > 0. 
 
Opportunities (O) and searches (S) yield a flow of new jobs according to a matching 
function M, which has constant returns to scale, is concave, increasing in both its arguments, 
and satisfies the Inada conditions. Although scale improves matching, there are also 
negative effects of scale as screening costs rise. Thus although matching improves with O 
and S, there are constant returns to scale, and the effect of ICT is modeled through a rise in 
mo > 0, which parameterizes search frictions.  A rise in mo implies a reduction in these 
frictions and a rise in the matching rate. It captures the effect of ICT in reducing transaction 
costs, improving monitoring, and reducing the relationship specificity of investment. Thus: 
),(
: 2
SOMmm
thatsuchRRM
o=
→ ++
                                                 (1)                           
The flow probability or the rate per unit time that a searching worker locates an opportunity 
is given by: 
SSOMmo /),(=μ                                                               (2)                           
                          
The rate at which an opportunity locates a worker is: 
OSOMm /),(0=η                                                        (3) 
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Since an opportunity is utilized by only one worker, 
OS ημ =                                                                         (4) 
In steady state, this must equal β, which is the entry rate of new workers. 
 
The model is solved in the appendix to determine a unique wage offer function w(y, μ, η, r) 
for lifetime earnings (Equation A14). Comparative static results derived in the Appendix 
are:  
 
Result 1:  A rise in η raises the firm’s outside option and therefore lowers its wage offer; a 
rise in y raises the total available for distribution and therefore raises wages; an 
improvement in the worker’s bargaining position φ will raise wages; with a rise in μ, the 
flow probability of locating a vacancy, more options become available to workers thus 
raising their wage offer; a rise in entry cost c raises the value of the firm’s outside 
opportunity and therefore lowers its wage offer. 
 
The expanding use of ICT and the Internet will raise mo or the efficiency of the matching 
process and per worker output y, and reduce c or the cost of entry. Result 2 gives the 
comparative static results of changes in these three parameters on steady-state values of 
w*(y, c, μ, φ) and the quadruple (μ*, η*, S*, O*). 
 
Result 2:  All these three factors will raise equilibrium wages w*; only mo will increase both 
μ and η; the fall in c and rise in y will raise μ but lower η; S will fall and O rise, with the fall 
in c and rise in y; both will fall with the rise in mo.   
 
We know that μ > η benefits workers, since opportunities exceed searching workers. 
Alternative options become available for workers and therefore their bargaining position 
improves. The match surplus will rise and so will firm’s profits initially, but the free entry 
assumption implies that these will be competed away. The fall in c and rise in y will attract 
more firms and thus benefit workers in the steady state. Entry of distant workers ICT 
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facilitates raises β, and thus has permanent scale effects, raising S*, and O*, which in turn 
improve matching thus benefiting both firms and workers. 
 
The effect on (μ*, η*) can also be seen graphically. The free entry condition defines an 
implicit function OO along which δO/δt = 0.    This gives the combinations of μ and η for 
which O is unchanging over time, since costs equal benefits of entry for firms. The CRS 
matching technology M defines another implicit function SS in η and μ space along which 
δS/δt = 0.   This gives the combinations of μ and η for which S does not change, since costs 
equal benefits of searching for workers. The OO and SS curves are graphed in μ η space in 
Figure 1.  OO is linear and upward sloping and SS convex to the origin and downward 
sloping (the slopes are derived in the Appendix).  
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Figure 1: Match equilibria and the effects of ICT 
 
Figure 1 shows the net effects on μ* and η* of changes in the exogenous parameters due to 
ICT.  A rise in matching effectiveness of mo shifts out the SS curve and raises both μ and η 
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to the equilibrium C.  But together with the rise in y and fall in c the net effects are a large 
rise in μ and fall in η at the new equilibrium B. 
 
These effects of ICT are heightened if we explicitly allow for the workers' choice of training 
and the firms' choice of technology.  
 
3.Choice of Technology and Education Levels 
We now assume that there are two types of investment, in the pre-market period, which can 
raise output per worker.  The assumption of no credit constraints implies these can be 
financed. At a cost υ the firm can acquire a new ICT machine τ.  If the firm acquires the new 
machine, τ takes the value of 1 and is zero otherwise. The worker can choose to undergo h 
units of training, from the interval [0, h ] at a cost c(h), in the period before coming into the 
market. Since we assume utility is transferable between workers and firms, we can focus on 
the total surplus.  The firm may finance pre-market period training since long-term complete 
contracting between the firm and the worker is feasible.  In case of separation the worker 
would make a transfer payment to the firm, therefore it does not matter who incurs the cost 
of training.  These transfer payments do not affect the marginal incentive to invest in 
training. The assumptions make it possible to focus on and analyze the effect of education 
and technology on distance work. Output is produced in the market period. Only workers 
with initial training further increase their human capital through learning by doing, at the 
rate γ(h) on the base, which is some function k of h.  Thus for an employment interval tE 
human capital accumulation becomes,  
Ethehkh )()( γ=                                                        (5) 
Output per worker now becomes,  
),(),( hyha τατ +=                                                      (6) 
10 => τα if  
This implies strict complementarity between the acquisition of new technology and human 
capital.  One adds to output only in the presence of the other. The cost function is: 
ντ+= )(hcC                                                           (7) 
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Standard concavity assumptions (Appendix, A21) ensure that equilibrium exists, since there 
are diminishing returns to education and the present discounted value of a match is bounded. 
 
Since training and technology raise y and therefore the match surplus and wages, they have a 
self-reinforcing aspect.  The more they are adopted, the higher the returns to adopting them. 
From Figure 1 we know that a rise in y has a relatively greater impact on μ and therefore w. 
Now it is clear that both τ and h raise y. ICT would increase the workers’ own returns from 
training. The expansion in availability of relatively low-wage workers will encourage the 
further adoption of technology that makes it possible to utilize them (Acemoglu, 1997). The 
assumptions ensure the existence of a unique determinate equilibrium, which maximizes 
welfare. But under slight, realistic modifications, multiple equilibria and inefficiencies could 
occur due to a number of causes.  
 
First, training could rise with the flow probability of a successful search, μ, since the 
expected benefits from education rise. A rise in  μ now has two effects on entry of firms. It 
raises wage and therefore lowers entry, but it raises the level of workers’ training and 
therefore raises entry. The OO curve becomes non-linear with an initial downward sloping 
segment, giving rise to multiple stable equilibria4 at low and at high μ. There is a possibility 
of being trapped in a low-level equilibrium steady state, where the level of private 
investment will be less than socially optimal. A policy induced rise in mo and upward shift in 
the SS curve will shift the system to the high level equilibrium with optimal investment.  
 
To consider multiple equilibria arising from the adoption of technology, suppose a match 
can be destroyed in the market period, which follows the training period, with probability s. 
For simplicity, the entry birth rate β is now fixed at zero, and there is an exogenous per 
period probability of separation s.  In steady state separations equal matches:  
 
mo M(O, S) = sE                                                               (8) 
                                     
4 Such equilibria are explicitly derived in Liang et. al. (1995). 
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If search and opportunities are not changing, new matches available must equal separations 
from the existing employed. After a separation, there is a probability that technology and 
training will not occur together in the new match. Now consider workers and firms making 
an investment decision.   
 
Result 3: If there is a positive probability of separation 0 < s <1, then private parties may 
not recover the full returns to their investment, so that multiple equilibria exist and 
underinvestment may occur. If a critical mass adopt all adopt, below that no one adopts.  
 
Proof: From the definitions above, the total surplus (TS) available to the firm and the worker 
in period 2, after the shock, is: 
TS = (1-s)(y+α(..))+sψ(y+α(..))-(1+r)C                                     (9) 
Since investment raises productivity we assume α(..) > (1+r)C. With probability (1-s) there 
is no separation and the pair captures the full return on their investment made at cost C, in 
the first period.  But, after separation due to a match specific shock, each firm and worker 
has to find a new pair. Under random matching, the probability of a good match, which 
equals the proportion of the population investing and training, is ψ. Therefore the new match 
surplus will be only ψ(y+α(..)) with probability s. If the proportion investing, ψ→1 all will 
find it profitable to undertake investment since TS is y+α(..) -(1+r)C > 0.  But if ψ→ 0 the 
private returns to investment are only (1-s)(y+α(..)-(1+r)C, this can be negative if s high, so 
that no one will invest. If s is close to 1, TS is - (1+r)C, no one investing is the unique 
equilibrium. If s = 0, TS is y+α(..) -(1+r)C > 0, everyone investing is the unique 
equilibrium. Therefore 0 < s < 1 is necessary and sufficient for multiple equilibria to exist. 
All agents investing is an equilibrium, but so is no one investing. Given s, (1-
s)(y+α(..))+sψ*(y+α(..)) = (1+r)C, determines the critical value ψ*. If ψ > ψ*, ψ→1. 
 
Government policy can contribute to raising ψ above ψ*. Underinvestment in training can 
also arise if the firm is able to extract the entire match surplus, because of network effects, 
and the wage offer falls.  This is explored through an example in the next section.  
 
 11
4. Networks and Extraction of Surplus 
So far we have considered the distribution of the match surplus between two contracting 
parties, one in region A and the other in B. We now bring in a second region A firm as a 
simple way of capturing the effect of networks on match surplus. Since the density of 
interactions is much higher in the developed region A, agents in the region A have power to 
leverage their networks. This allows them to extract more of the match surplus. When third 
parties are involved, region B agents may be forced to enter into transactions that give them 
negative utility. In the simple example5 illustrating this process below, the dominant region 
A firm is able to obtain the surplus from the region B worker’s transaction with a second 
region A firm by making the second firm stop interacting with the distance worker unless 
the latter agrees to a bargain favoring the dominant firm. ICT, by increasing region B's 
participation in networks, will remove this cause of surplus extraction. Therefore new 
technologies and the outsourcing they make possible have the potential to mitigate long 
entrenched global inequalities. 
 A II 
                                                
 C D 
 
 
                                                
                        
                         
 
                                                   
g, g 
0, f 
f, 0 
e, eC
A I 
 
 D  
 
 
 
Figure 2:  A co-ordination game between region A firms 
 
 
                                     
5 Basu (2000), chapter 6, analyzes the effect of third party transactions on coercion in the context of interlinked 
rural markets. 
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There are two Region A firms, AI and AII, of which AI is the bigger.  They have a number 
of business transactions with each other.  If both adopt business plan or strategy C returns to 
both are higher than if one or both of them follow strategy D.  That is, they play a co-
ordination game with strategic complementarities. In Figure 2, which gives the payoffs, AI’s 
payoffs are written first. Since e > g > f > 0, there are two Nash equilibria in this game: (C, 
C) and (D, D). Both AI and AII enter into transactions with a Region B firm (B).  AII stands 
to gain SAII from the transaction and B would gain SBII.  If they do not transact together these 
values would be zero. 
 
The bigger firm, AI, has the first move.  It offers a wage W and employment E, pair (W, E) 
to B for the job.  In the next period of the game B can accept or reject this take it or leave it 
offer.  In the third period B and AII decide on their trade and in the final period AI and AII 
carry out their transaction. 
 
Result 4: Network effects and strategic interactions can leave the Region B firm at its no 
trade level of profits, and it can even make a loss on its transactions with a Region A firm. 
 
Proof: AI threatens AII with strategy D, if AII trades with B in the case of B refusing AI’s 
offer.  The threat is effective in stopping AII trading with B if e-g > SAII. When the 
inequality holds, AII loses more from the reduction in its transaction with AI, than it gains 
from trading with B. The threat is a credible one for AI to make only if its loss on playing D 
with AII is less than its potential gain from trade with B. This requires Π(W*, E*) > e-g. 
That is, AI’s profits from its interaction with B, Π(W*, E*), exceed AI’s loss in playing D 
rather than C with AII, e-g.   
 
AI maximizes its profits, subject to B's participation constraint. That is, the sum of B's gains 
from transactions with AI and AII, where c is the cost B incurs, per unit of employment E, 
must not be negative for B to be willing to participate in the transactions: 
EW
Max
,
      WEEyEW −=Π )(),(  
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subject to                                            (10) 0≥+− BIIScEWE
AI maximizes its profits when the participation constraint holds with equality, so that WE - 
cE = -SBII.  This condition determines its equilibrium offer (W*, E*) to B. Thus, the payoffs 
will be such that B will earn zero, AII will earn SAII+ e, and AI will earn, Π(W*, E*) + e.  
AI extracts the entire surplus from B, including what B earns from its transaction with AII.   
 
Since AI’s credible threat lies off the equilibrium path it would not be observed in actual 
play. It will only be implicit. The general point is that future trades, including those between 
sellers and other buyers, matter when network effects are present; therefore strategic, 
dynamic effects occur (Farrell and Klemperer, 2002). AI is able to extract some of B’s 
surplus from B’s interaction with third parties, as long as AI has more interactions with 
these other parties than B has. 
 
ICT will increase SAII and raise it above e – g, so that AII would not want to endanger its 
interaction with B; then AI’s threat will no longer be effective and the surplus extraction 
fails. As the density of B’s interactions rise, it will have alternatives to both AI and AII. By 
making entry of new firms easier it will reduce the hold of AI on both B and AII, which 
arise from its premier position in the network.  B’s exit options and bargaining power 
improves. 
 
The source of AI's advantage is partly greater information.  It knows more about the markets 
and other firms.  Equivalently B does not know firms other than AI and AII or finds the 
transaction costs of contacting them very high.  ICT lowers the cost of acquiring 
information. The Internet6 lowers these costs but, unlike a monopolistic firm, does not 
require to be compensated for doing so, partly because adding content advertises those 
contents, and partly because it is not owned by anyone. AI, in contrast, extracts a rent for the 
information it provides or the trade it allows, and gives B the least consistent with B's 
                                     
6 Open standards are a key feature to realize these benefits. As Mansell (2001) points out electronic EDI 
systems allowed Northern firms to exchange standardized information using proprietary software platforms 
and create closed networks. 
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participation. Research has discovered, however, that the Internet only benefits those job 
searchers who are otherwise qualified (Kuhn, 2003); since costs of search are low, the 
proportion of inadequate candidates using it is more. Therefore some independent 
certification and initial physical contact are also important to enter networks.   
 
Apart from information about trading partners, knowledge of international standards is 
necessary for region B to raise the quality of its output sufficiently to access new markets. 
ICT helps acquire this information also but open standards are essential for these benefits to 
accrue fully. This issue is explored further in drawing together the conclusions for policy in 
the next section.  
 
5. Policy Conclusions 
In the models, a rise in the efficiency of the matching process benefits both firms and 
workers. The entry of new distant workers increases the scale, improves matching, and again 
benefits both. Under free entry of firms more workers would induce entry of more firms and 
expand the level of activity. An improvement in ICT improves matching. It also raises per 
worker productivity, and reduces the cost of entry of new firms, both of which raise 
equilibrium wage offers to workers. Therefore encouraging the spread of ICT, access and 
bandwidth, should be a key policy objective. 
 
Since region A firms obtain the major share of the match surplus and make large transient 
profits, a low tax on them can be used to help establish a specific welfare fund to upskill and 
redeploy region A workers that loose jobs temporarily. Firms will factor in some of the 
losses to workers, but unlike with a ban, will still be able to outsource if cost savings are 
very high7. Cheap education and training facilities in Region A will also prevent adverse 
effects on low skill workers there of the kind Feenstra and Hanson (1995) document. De 
Long (2002) argues that a major reason for the rapid rise in inequality in America in the last 
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decade has been the decline in the quality of primary education and the affordability of 
secondary education. Here there is clearly a role for government policy. 
 
A rise in the efficiency of the matching process, affects both search and opportunities 
equally, but a rise in per worker productivity, and fall in the cost of entry of new firms 
increase opportunities and reduce searching workers. Therefore they benefit workers 
relatively more than they benefit firms. They increase the flow probability that a searching 
worker locates an opportunity relative to the flow probability that an opportunity locates a 
worker. Therefore the workers get a larger share of the match surplus. Free competitive 
entry of firms reduces excess profits to zero. Policy conclusion: giving a larger weight to 
technology and training, and ensuring competitive entry will tend to reduce inequality within 
and across countries over time. 
 
Moreover, the enhanced matching model shows that training and technology have a self-
reinforcing aspect. The more they are adopted, the higher the returns to adopting them. 
Training choice responds positively to a rise in the flow probability of a match, and to firms' 
adoption of better technology. Returns to the technology and learning by doing, in turn, 
improve with training. But these effects imply the flow probability of a match rises with 
training so that multiple equilibria are possible. In that case, the level of private investment 
may be less than socially optimal. Well-designed public intervention can trigger large 
changes. The rise in productivity would benefit both regions. Any one country imposing a 
ban on outsourcing would loose out in the benefits from technology and training. 
 
There are strong incentives for training in conditions where opportunities are expanding. 
Strict quality standards can strengthen these incentives8. Such quality standards will ensure 
                                                                                                                
7 An interesting example of outsourcing that did not lead to job loss, was when Dabur an Indian Pharma 
company outsourced its IT and other system maintenance to Accenture, an American company, in 2004. 
Accenture employed some Dabur employees to do the job.  
8 Such quality standards are automatic for traded goods and by demonstration extend to others. NASSCOM 
(2002) argues that high quality is the reason for India's success in software exports. Mansell (2001), 
"....producer firms are required to meet new quality, time-to-delivery, or other standards introduced by buyers 
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that employers will be willing to expand education and training facilities to shift workers 
above the threshold. The availability of labour skills, in turn, can induce firms to adopt new 
technology in a beneficial feedback cycle.  
 
Workers from region B benefit not only from the rise in wages, but also in so far as these 
technologies allow them to participate in distant markets. As their exit options improve such 
workers would get a better bargain. Thus despite more flexibility in labour markets workers 
bargaining power could improve. Unions should focus more on training, insurance and 
access activities.  
 
In transactions between region A and B firms or individuals, a source of the formers’ 
advantage is more information and deeper networks. This is one explanation for the low 
share of region B in the match surplus. ICT has the potential to improve Region B’s access 
to networks, and create new networks, thus reducing the disadvantages of uneven access. 
Institutional support is required, however, for the initial access. Industry bodies, 
governments, or international institutions can encourage new specialized networks. ICT 
lowers the cost of acquiring information both about potential trading partners and about 
standards of acceptable products. Knowledge of the latter is vital for the Region B to access 
new markets. 
 
Open standards are essential for the above effects. When network effects dominate it pays to 
expand the market. Therefore far-seeing policies should lock-in the large new populations 
into the networks, even at the cost of some minor current concessions on openness and 
market access. Conversion costs of common standards should be lowered. There is a result 
that when standardization conversion costs are small relative to network effects all regions 
gain from accepting common standards (Gandal and Shy, 2001). 
 
                                                                                                                
in the industrialized countries (pp.290)." Such standards are impossible to achieve with illiterate and 
subsistence labour.   
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The spread of open standards in the ICT industry gives valuable lessons, to apply to 
different kinds of networks. Open standards enhance competition and innovation. But are 
especially valuable when they apply to inputs, and where innovation occurs in small steps 
through a series of contributors. Such interoperability turns competitors into complementors. 
It has been argued that international patent rights (IPRs) should be limited to facilitate 
interoperability between competing products. When there are network effects, consumers 
value compatibility and IPRs by turning the initial choices of a small user group into de-
facto standards, may confer monopoly rights without any significant innovation. There 
should be only limited copyright protection for interfaces when a firm improves an interface, 
to allow products of different manufacturers to work together in a computer system. 
Reproduction and translation of copyright code is essential for this (Gandal, 2002).  
 
Network externality can imply rapid death for small local networks unless compatibility is 
built in. Small new entrants need to negotiate for survival, to keep options open, to think 
strategically and combine with those who would gain. They must be willing to learn the 
language before contributing to it, be willing to engage in a range of activities and move 
slowly up to higher value added products.  
 
Standards help specialists who want to compete globally, but incompatibility helps sustain 
local protection. In markets where incompatibility is a strategic choice regulation is 
required. Inefficient firms with large installed bases may insist on incompatibility to deter 
rivals who would be much more effective with compatibility. With strategic pressure 
markets may lock into inefficient standards. Therefore measures to enhance the role of 
public and quasi-public standard development organizations and their speed and conflict 
resolution capabilities are of great value.  
 
Under network externalities competition policy has to consider dynamic aspects. It may be 
necessary to give concessions initially in order to make a market, and such concessions may 
not be aimed at destroying competition. Therefore policies that improve one's product need 
to be distinguished from those that block a competitor. Open standards can help prevent the 
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latter. Competition policy should give rivals rights such as reverse engineering that allow 
them to insist on compatibility, notwithstanding patent rights (Farrell and Klemperer, 2002).  
 
ICT itself has many benefits for labour; but inducing more innovation and learning through 
economic incentives can multiply the benefits many times. 
 
Appendix 
The matching model 
A worker can be either searching (S) or employed (E).  A firm can have an opportunity that 
is filled (F) or existing (O).  There are asset values associated with each of these states.  
Thus the “return” on the asset value of being employed (VE) is a dividend of wages (w) per 
unit time. 
wVr E =  
Or VE is the present discounted value of income accruing to the worker from the match.  
Similarly the return to the firm of a filled opportunity is its share of the match surplus.  That 
is output (y) minus wages, 
wyr F −=Π  
The asset value of continued search or keeping an opportunity unfilled respectively, comes 
from the value of a match subtracted from the value of continued searching, 
)( sEs VVVr −= μ  
)( oFor Π−Π=Π η  
Rearranging gives the four asset values as: 
rwVE /=                                                                 A1                           
rwyF /)( −=Π                                                         A2                           
Es VrV )/( += μμ                                                     A3                           
Fo r Π+=Π )/( ηη                                                     A4 
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The match must determine a wage, but because labour is heterogeneous a replacement 
cannot be found instantly, so there is a range of wages between the demand and supply price 
of labour, which makes each party better off than they would have been without the match.  
If there is symmetric Nash bargaining the surplus is shared equally, so that, 
0≥Π−Π=− OFSE VV                                                       A5                           
The unique wage offer function determined by substituting Eqs. A1 to A4 in Eq. A5 is: 
}2/{)}({ μημ +++= rryw                                                     A6                           
Firms and workers take η and μ as parametric in making decisions, although they are 
endogenously determined in the equilibrium.  If η = μ Eq.A6 implies that y would be split 
between the two.  If μ > η workers find new opportunities faster than firms can find people, 
so more than half the surplus goes to the worker. Differentiating A6 tells us how the wage 
offer varies with the parameters: 
δw/δη<0,   δw/δμ>0,    δw/δy>0                                           A7                           
In the case of the more general Nash bargain where φ is the share of the match surplus (MS) 
going to the worker: 
MSandMSrwVV OFSE )1()/( φφμ −=Π−Π=+=−                      A8  
Solving for w in this case: 
})1(/{})({ μφφημφ +−++= ryrw                                  A9                           
And then differentiating A9 gives similar partial derivatives, with the new result that the 
wage offer rises with the workers share of the match surplus:  
δw/δy > 0,    δw/δφ > 0,    δw/δμ > 0,   δw/δη < 0                            A10                           
The free entry condition closes the model, ensuring that Πo is driven down to c. Substituting 
this in A8 and then solving for w: 
}2/{)}({ μφφφ −−−= rrrcyw                                         A11                           
The derivatives remain unchanged, only the negative effect on the wage offer of η is now 
replaced with the negative effect of c from Eq. A11. 
δw/δy > 0,    δw/δφ > 0,    δw/δμ > 0,      δw/δc < 0                             A12                           
Substituting A1 to A3 in A5 and imposing Πo = c gives: 
                                               })}{2/(){( rcyrrw −++= μμ                                             A13 
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This is the case of free entry and equal share of the match surplus. The derivatives are the 
same as (15) except that φ drops out. Result 1 gives a summary:  
 
Result 1: Comparative static results from the wage offer function: 
δw/δη<0,    δw/δy > 0,    δw/δφ > 0,    δw/δμ > 0,      δw/δc < 0                 A14 
                          
In the steady-state equilibrium the free entry condition and the matching technology 
determine μ* and η*.  These then determine w* from Eq. A12, and S* and O* from Eqns. 
A15.1 and A15.2 which imply that S* = β/μ* and O* = β/ η*. The steady state is defined 
as9: 
 
Definition1: Steady-state equilibrium is a wage function w(y, c, μ, φ) and a quadruple (μ*, 
η*, S*, O*) satisfying the conditions: 
                        (i)            (Nash Bargain)                      MScandMSVV FSE )1(
*** φφ −=−Π=−
(ii)        (free entry) co =Π*
                        (iii)                                    A15.1 ),( **0
**** OSMmOS ==ημ
                       (steady-state)                                     A15.2 βμ =**S
The implicit function OO is defined as: 
0/,0/,0/),;( ><>= cywithcy oooooooo δδηδδηδμδημηη                      A16 
Substituting A2 and A13 in A4 and imposing free entry gives a specific function, which 
clearly satisfies the derivatives in A16. 
)/(})2{( rcycr −+= μη  
Since a rise in μ raises wages, fewer firms enter, opportunities fall, and therefore η (= m/O) 
rises. A rise in y or fall in c makes entry more attractive thus raising entry and lowering η, 
the rate at which opportunities locate a worker. 
 
                                     
9 Laing et.al. (1995) obtain similar results in an application of the matching model to study endogenous growth 
and training decisions. 
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The implicit function SS is defined as: 
,0/,0/);( ><= ossssoss mwithm δδηδμδημηη                                 A17 
Since m = mo O M (S/O, 1), η = m/O, and S/O= η/μ, therefore η = mo M(η/ μ,1),  is the 
required implicit function.  The Inada conditions satisfied by the matching technology M 
imply that the derived implicit function is convex to the origin, with asymptotes that 
approach the two axes.  
 
Result 2: The effects of changes in mo, y and c on unique steady-state values of (i) μ*, η*, 
(ii) S* O* and, (iii) w* are:  
(i)                0/,0/,0/ **0
* <>> dcddyddmd μμμ
 
      (for matching rates μ*, η*)        A18 0/,0/,0/ **0* ><> dcddyddmd ηηη
 
(ii)                   0/,0/,0/ *** ><< dcdSdydSdmdS o
                      (for S0/,0/,0/ **0
* <>< dcdOdydOdmdO *,O*)                 A19 
 
(iii)                  (for equilibrium wages, w0/,0/,0/ *** <>> dcdwdydwdmdw o *) 
A20 
Proof: Given the shapes of the SS and OO curves a unique equilibrium exists and 
determines a pair (μ*, η*) satisfying (ii) and (iii) of definition 1.  To prove the comparative 
static results: 
 
(i) For matching rates: 
Totally differentiating the steady-state equilibrium conditions: 
( ) 0,;** =− cyoo μημ  
( ) 0; 0** =− mss μημ  
Letting λ stand for y, c, and mo: 
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δλ
δη
λ
μ
δμ
δη
λ
η oooo
d
d
d
d =−
**
 
δλ
δη
λ
μ
δμ
δη
λ
η ssss
d
d
d
d =−
**
 
Writing in matrix form 
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
=
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−
δλ
δη
δλ
δη
λ
μ
λ
η
δμ
δη
δμ
δη
ss
oo
ss
oo
d
d
d
d
*
*
1
1
 
 
det
1
1
=
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−
δμ
δη
δμ
δη
ss
oo
 
From A16 and A17 the determinant, det > 0. 
Using Cramer's rule 
 
det
* ⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−
= δμ
δη
δλ
δη
δμ
δη
δλ
δη
λ
η
ssss
oooo
d
d  
 
det
1
1
* ⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
= δλ
δη
δλ
δη
λ
μ
ss
oo
d
d  
The signs of the derivative follow using A16 and A17 and substituting for λ. 
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(ii) For steady-state opportunities O* and searching workers S*: From definition 1, 
S* = ß/μ, therefore the sign of dS*/dλ will be the negative of the sign of dμ*/dλ 
which was derived in (i) above. 
 
From definition 1, O* =  ß/η, therefore the sign of dO*/dλ will be the negative of 
the sign of dη*/dλ, which was derived in (i) above. 
 
(iii) For equilibrium wages: Totally differentiating the wage offer function A13 with 
respect to λ gives: 
)/()/(// ***** λμδμδδλδλ ddwwddw +=  
Substituting the signs obtained in Result 1 and in part (i) of Result 2, gives the 
required signs. 
 
Concavity assumptions: 
1. The function  is strictly increasing, differentiable, and concave with 
  and   
[ 1,0: →+Rk ]
0)(lim 0 >→ hkh 1)(lim ≤→ hkhh  
 
2. The function [ ]1,0:)( →+Rhc  is strictly increasing, differentiable, and convex s.t  
 and 0)(lim 0 =→ hch ∞=→ )(lim hchh  
 
3. The rate of growth of human capital ++ → RR:γ  is strictly increasing, 
differentiable, strictly concave with ζγ <→ )(lim hhh . 
 
4. The function  is strictly concave in h.                                                 (A21) RRa →+2:
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